Current developments in commercial bank investment portfolio management by Woodruff, David Henry
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1958
Current developments in
commercial bank investment
portfolio management
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/21085
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
College of Business Administration 
THESIS 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMERCIAL 
BANK INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
by 
David Henry Woodruff 
(A.B. Bowdoin College 1952) 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
1958 
-
2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page No. 
I . INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • 11 
Statement of the Problem • • • • 11 
Purpose of the Inquiry • • • • • • 11 
Definition • • • • • • • • • 11 
Importance of Commercial Bank Investment 
Portfolio ?~agement • • • • • 13 
Objectives • • • • • • • • • • 13 
Primary • • • • • • • • 13 
Large Versus Small Bank Point of View • • 13 
Secondary • • • • • • • • • 14 
Events Durin~ the Period 1954-1957 • • • • 14 
Interest Rates • • • • • • • 14 
Business Fluctuations and Interest Rate 
Movements • • • • • • • • 14 
Bond Prices • • 15 
Changes in the Size of Commercial Bank 
Investment Portfolio • • • • • 15 
Federal Reserve Policy • • • 15 
Treasury Department Management Policy • • • 15 
Methods of Investigation • • • • 16 
Questionnaire • 16 
Primary Research • • • • 16 
Secondary Research • • • • • • • 17 
Acknowled~ents • • • • 17 
3 
Chapter Pa~e No. 
II . INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS • • 20 
Need for Stability of PrinciEal • • • • • 20 
Small Capital Cushion • • • • • 20 
Nature of a Bank ' s Deposits • • • • • • 20 
Increased Loan Demand • • • • • • 22 
Other Reguirements • • • • • • • 22 
Sound Investment ~~nagement • • • • 22 
Stability of Investment Income • • • • • 22 
Highly Marketable Securities • • • 22 
Tax-Exempt Securities • • • 23 
Le~al Restrictions • • 23 
Federal and State Regulations • • • 23 
Acceptable Bond Rating Categories • • 23 
Priorities in the Use of Bank Funds • • • • 23 
General Priorities in the Use of Bank Funds • 23 
Loans versus Investments • • • • • 24 
Priorities in the Use of Investment Portfolio 
Funds • • • • • • • 24 
Liquidity versus Profitability • • 24 
III. FORMULATION OF BANK INVESTMENT POLICY • • • • 26 
Situation of the Individual Bank • • • • 26 
Chapter 
IV. 
Basic Studies that a Portfolio Manager 
Should Make • • • • • 
Survey Observation • • • • • 
Goal of Bank Investment Programs • • 
Elements • • • • • • 
Compromise • • • • • • 
Basic Principles in the Formulation of 
Investment Policy • • • • • 
List of Principles • • • • • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Comparison with Results of Questionnaire 
Additional Observations • • • • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
City Banks as Sources of Investment Advice • 
Bond Dealers as Sources of Advice • • • 
Considerations Involved in a Bank's S~lection 
of its Brokers • • • • • 
11Rules of Thumb" Used by Banks in Selecting 
Their Investments • • • • 
THE INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO AND COM1ffiRCIAL BANK 
LIQUIDITY • • • • • • • 
Why Commercial Banks Need Liquidity • • 
Possible Deposit Declines • • • • • 
To Meet Loan Demand • • • • 
To Take Advantage of Investment Opportunities 
Secondary Reserves as a Source of Liquiditl • 
Ways Earning Assets Contribute to Liquidity 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
4 
Pa~e No. 
26 
28 
28 
28 
28 
28 
29 
29 
31 
31 
31 
31 
32 
33 
33 
33 
34 
34 
35 
35 
5 
Chapter P.a~e No . 
Traditional Banking Theory • • • • • • • 35 
Determinants of Investment Liquidit.y • • 35 
Factors to be Considered in Evaluating a 
Bank's Liquidity Needs • • • • • 36 
Liguidity Versus Profitabilitl • • • • • 36 
Necessary Compromise • • • • • • • • 36 
Periods of Rising Loan Demand • • • • • • 37 
v. SECONDARY RESERVES • • • • • • • • 38 
Purposes and Division of Secondarz Reserves • • • 38 
Purpose • • • • • • • • • • • 38 
Major Divisions • • • • • • • • • 38 
Secondary Reserve • • .. • • • 38 
Purpose • • • • • • • • 38 
Theory and Practice • • • • • • • 39 
Survey Observation • • • • • • • 39 
Tertiary Reserve • • • • • • • • • • 40 
Purpose • • • • • • • • • 40 
Theory and Practice • • • • • • • • 41 
Survey Observations • • • • • • • 41 
VI. TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SECURITIES SUITABLE 
FOR COMMERCIAL BANK INVESTMENT • • • • • • 43 
Direct Obligations of the United States 
Treasu:z ( 11Governments11 ) • • • • • 43 
Credit Risk and Interest Rate Risk • • • • 45 
6 
Chapter Page No. 
Maturities and Exchange Privileges • • • • 45 
Survey Observations • • • • • • • 46 
Securities of the Instrumentalities of the 
United States Government ("Agenc;y: Bonds 11 ) • • 46 
Credit Risk • • • • • • • 46 
Types of Securities and Maturities • • • 47 
SUrvey Observation • • • • • • • 47 
Munici;eals and Other Tax Free Obligations 
~ 11Mu.niciEais 11 ) • • • • • • • • 48 
Definition • • • • • • • 48 
Favorable Features 49 
Unfavorable Feature • • • • • • • • 49 
Descriptions of the Three Categories • • • 49 
Survey Observations • • • • so 
Corporate Bonds (ttCorporates") • • • • • so 
Current Status • • • • • • • 51 
Railroad Equipment Trust Certificate • • 51 
Survey Observations • • • • • • • 51 
VII. ECONOMIC FCRECASTING AND THE INVESTMENT 
PORTFOLIO • • • • • • • • • 52 
Economic Forecasts Em;eloled in Investment 
Portfolio Management • • • • • • • 52 
Funds Position Projections • • • • • • 53 
7 
Chapter Page No . 
Secondary Reserve Position Forecasts • • • 53 
General Business Forecasts • • • • • 55 
Si~nificance of Yield Curves • • • 56 
Definition and Explanation of Yield Curves • 56 
Implications of the Existence of Rate 
Patterns • • • • • • • 56 
Yield Curves as a Forecasting Device • • 59 
Survey Results • • • • • 59 
VIII. ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON INVESTlffiNT PORTFOLIO 
MANAGEMENT • • • • • • • 60 
Diversification • • • • • 60 
Definition • • • • • • • • • 60 
Survey Observations • • • • • • • 61 
Trading • • • • • • • • 61 
Definition • • • • • • • 61 
Situation 1Vhere Trading May be Engaged in 
by Commercial Banks • • • • • 62 
Survey Observations • • • • • • • 62 
Case Illustration • • • • • 62 
Bond Losses of Banks • • • • • • 63 
Tax Switching • • • • • • • 64 
8 
Chapter Page No. 
Special Tax Relief Offered to Banks • • • 64 
Survey Observations • • • • • 65 
IX. ANALYSIS OF "ALlOCATION OF COMMERCIAL BANK 
F'UliDS 11 TECHNIQUE • • • • • • • 66 
Description of the "Allocation Technique" • • • 66 
Goal: Synchronization of a Bank's Assets 
With the Demands of its Depositors • • • 66 
Basic Assumption Governing this Approach • • 67 
Technique • • • • • • • 67 
Classification of Liabilities • • • • • 67 
Balancing of Liabilit.y Classifications • • • 67 
Relation of Investments to Other Assets • • • 68 
Yardsticks for Individual Banks • • • 68 
Anal;2:sis • • • • • • • 68 
Requirement • • • • • • • • 68 
Seasonal Fluctuations • • • • • • 70 
Profitability • • • • • • • 70 
Liquidity • • • • • • • • 71 
Findings • • • • • • • • 71 
Adaptabilit.y of This Technique • • • • 71 
Rejection of This Plan for Widespread Use • • 72 
9 
Chapter Page No . 
x. SU1ruARY AND CONCLUSIONS • • • • 73 
LIST OF TABLES • • • • • • • • 10 
LIST OF CHA....li.TS • • • • • • • • 11 
QUESTIONNAIRE • 79 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • 85 
10 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page No. 
I . Assets of all Commercial Banks • • • • • • 13 
II. Types of Securities Suitable for Commercial 
Bank Investment in Order of Importance • • • 44 
III. Three Month Secondary Reserve Position Forecast 
for Bank XY'l • • • • • • • 54 
TIT . An Example of the Allocation of a 
Commercial Bank's Funds • • • • • • 69 
11 
LIST OF CHARTS 
Chart Pa~e No . 
I . Bond Yields and Interest Rates (1953- 1957) • • • 16 
II. Division of the Balance Sheet of a 
Typical Commercial Bank • • • • • 21 
III. The Three General T,ypes of Yield Curves • • • 57 
12 
CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
The basic purpose of this inquiry is to observe and comment 
upon current developments in commercial bank investment portfolio 
management. There has been no attempt to draw a statistical sample, nor 
has there been any effort to lay down any precise rules that an indivi-
dual bank should follow. Rather, this is an attempt to identify and 
clarify certain basic issues in the light of today's requirements and 
current banking practice. Such an analysis, it is believed, will aid 
in the formulation of appropriate bank investment policy, regardless of 
the size of the institution. 
The "investment portfolio" of a bank is that portion of a 
bank's assets that are not in 11cash11 or 11loans 11 • Today, the greater 
portion of the total amount of securities publicly issued and traded is 
owned by institutional investors such as commercial banks, savings banks 
and insurance companies. As shown by Table I, approximately 44% of the 
earning assets of all connnercial banks are currently in "investments." 
For purposes of this paper, "investments" will be thought of as "credits 
not always but primarily of longer maturities placed through the open 
markets and ordinarily subject to resale in these markets."* 
*3, P• 12. 
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TABLE I . 
Assets of all Commercial Banks 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
Loans Investments Percentage 
investments 
are of total 
earning assets 
December 30, 1939 17,238 23,430 57 
December 31, 1945 26,083 97,937 79 
December 30, 1950 52,249 74,426 58 
December 31, 1955 82,601 78,280 48 
November 27, 1957 93,010 74,26o 44 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1958, p. 41. 
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On the asset side of a balance sheet of a commercial bank, 
"loans" and "investments" constitute the earning assets of the bank. 
The other major asset is "cashn upon which there is no return to the 
bank. It is the management of these earning assets that largely deter-
mines the earnings performance of the bank in question. As indicated in 
Table I, the investment portfolio of a typical commercial bank has 
constituted almost half of the total earning assets of that bank in 
recent years. Needless to say, the management of this portion of a bank's 
earning assets involves tremendous responsibilities and such management, 
without dire results, cannot be taken lightly. 
Objectives 
The primary objective of this study is to highlight recent 
thinking and developments in the area of commercial bank investment port-
folio management. The major point of view taken will be that of management 
and only indirectly that of the stockholder or depositor. 
One of the problems of an endeavor such as this is the fact 
that all commercial banks are not of the same size. Hence, it is possible 
to speak from a "small" or "large" bank point of view. Therefore, an 
attempt will be made, Whenever possible, to contrast investment procedures 
in both the large and the small commercial bank. Furthermore, this author 
feels that the small bank, in spite of its limitations as to trained 
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personnel, experience and time, should be aware of haw investment 
matters are handled in the larger institutions. If the small bank 
can duplicate certain procedures, all well and good. If not, at least 
the smaller bank can be aware of the various directions in which further 
effort can be profitably expended. However, the small banker should also 
be aware of the limitations under which he operates and should not try to 
follow procedures which he is not equipped to handle. 
A secondary objective is to provide a document which may serve 
as the foundation for a more comprehensive study in this field. As pre-
viously indicated, no attempt has been made to indicate 11the correct 
approach" in every situation. Rather, the author feels that the "outlining" 
of a problem area is almost as important as its solution. In fact, greater 
awareness of problems can go a long way toward better and more profitable 
management of a commercial bank's investment portfolio. 
Events during the period 1954-1957 
For purposes of continuity, this investigation has been limited 
to the recent period of rising interest rates. As shovm by Chart I, this 
period runs from the middle of 1954 to mid-November of 1957 when the 
Federal Reserve discount rate was reduced to 3% from its recent high of 
3.5% (the highest since 1933), a running time of about three years. 
At this point, one should recall that business dips and rebounds 
are reflected in interest rate movements. Generally speruting, as business 
CHART I . 
Bond Yields and Interest Rates (1952 - 1958) 
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gets better interest rates firm and rise, and as general business 
conditions decline interest rates tend to ease off. In turn, this 
easing and firming of interest rates have an innnediate effect on bond 
prices. 
Indeed, this three-year rise in interest rates had a noticeable 
impact on bond prices and yields. Bond prices drifted downward almost 
continuously, sometimes slowly, at other times quite rapidly. However, 
in spite of the steady decline in these prices, no selling panic developed 
such as occurred in 1953. 
During 1955 and 1956, commercial bank investment portfolio 
holdings declined $10.4 billion. In addition, during the first half of 
1957, bank investments were reduced $3.1 billion. However, during the 
latter half of the year, commercial banks added $4.6 billion to their invest-
ment portfolios, making the net results for the year an increase of $1.$ 
billion.* 
Beginning in 1955, the Federal Reserve Board adopted a policy of 
restraint on bank credit expansion, its object being to limit,rather than 
halt, the growth of commercial bank credit. This, of course, meant that 
the increased loan demand from 1955 on generally caused bankers to reduce 
their security portfolios in order to meet this more profitable avenue for 
the use of their funds. 
Because such a large portion of commercial bank investments are 
in Government securities, Treasury debt management policy has become 
*35, PP• 116-117. 
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another factor of importance. Treasury policy during this period has 
been to avoid any clash with business, in fact, one might safely state 
that the Treasury acted in a manner directly opposite to that of the 
Reserve. From 1955 on, it issued mostly short-term bills, certificates 
and notes.* 
Methods of investigation 
The first step, and the real nucleus of this investigation was 
the drafting of a questionnaire covering specific portfolio practice and 
general portfolio policy. The questionnaire was divided into different 
subdivisions dealing with various aspects of bank investment policy. One 
set of questions related to specific issues and the other set of questions 
referred to general phases of portfolio policy. A final draft of the 
questionnaire may be found in the Appendix. 
Armed with this questionnaire, the author consulted a number of 
bank investment officers in prominent large and small commercial banks in 
the New England area. This investigation also included some government 
bond houses, a few authorities at leading academic institutions, and one 
seminar program under the sponsorship of the Boston Chapter of the American 
Institute of Banking. 
At the same time as the primary research was in progress, 
considerable secondary research was being undertaken. In this area, one 
*22, P• 1. 
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discovery was that, since 19.51, very little material in book form has 
been produced that directly relates to this area of bank management. 
The completed thesis, of course, is the combined results of both 
endeavors. 
Acknowledgments 
The author wishes to acknowledge the generous assistance given 
by those individuals consulted. Their efforts contributed greatly in 
keeping this study headed in worthwhile directions. 
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CHAPI'ER II. 
INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the ability of 
commercial banks to assume investment risks. An understanding of this 
is important since the investment policies of any institution are largely 
determined by its investment requirements . 
Need for stability of principal 
For commercial banks, "stability of principal" is the major 
investment requirement. The reason for this is threefold. First, as 
illustrated by Chart II, the liabilities of a t,ypical commercial bank are 
very large in relation to its assets . Demand and time deposit liabilities 
recently comprised about 92 percent of the total assets of an average bank. 
This leaves a capital cushion of approximately 8 percent to absorb a~ loss 
or shrinkage in the value of the assets . Therefore, a relatively small 
loss within the investment portfolio would be a serious matter for the 
typical commercial bank. 
In the second place, an average bank has well over half of its 
deposits in the form of demand deposits. This, of course, means that the 
bank has the legal obligation of converting these deposits into currency 
"on demand. " Even in connection with time deposits, a bank is always well 
advised to pay them out as requested. 
CHART II. 
Division of the Balance Sheet of 
a Typical Commercial Bank 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
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The third reason, although not as compelling from a legal view-
point, is just as important from a competitive standpoint. A commercial 
bank is primarily an institution for making loans. If a bank does not 
meet all reasonable customer credit demands, its competitors usually will. 
During a long period of rising loan demand, such as we have just passed 
through, a commercial bank has two ways of meeting the situation: (a) by 
holding cash, and (b) by having investments Which can be quickly converted 
into cash with little loss. Since the holding of large amounts of excess 
cash lowers a bank's earnings, bankers logically look to the investment 
portfolio to supply additional loan fUnds as needed. 
Other requirements 
The quality of investment management usually varies with the 
size of the bank and often limits the ability of the individual bank to 
assume investment risks. The important thing here is for each bank to be 
aware of its limitations in this area and to invest accordingly. Moreover, 
regardless of the portfolio makeup, the bank in question must exercise 
sound and continuous investment management. 
Because inVestments make up such a large percentage of a bank's 
earning assets, banks do require a certain amount of stability of investment 
income. However, if stability of principal is adequately provided for, 
stability of investment income will usually be taken care of. 
Another investment requirement is for highly marketable 
securities. The reason for this is the legal requirement that deposits be 
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paid on demand, or in the case of time deposits, within a relatively 
short time. This constant danger of forced sale is something that no 
commercial banker can safely ignore . 
Tax-exempt securities are also a requirement since commercial 
banks are subject to the Federal corporate income tax. However, the tax 
position of each bank varies with its size making this requirement ver,y 
important for some banks and relatively unimportant for others. 
Legal restrictions 
Recognizing the investment requirements of commercial banks, 
both Federal and state laws limit the investments of commercial banks to 
bonds . With but few exceptions, ownership of stocks is prohibited. Even 
in the area of bond investment, only high-grade issues may be purchased. 
Today, bankers are required to limit their purchases to the top four bond 
rating categories (Aaa down through Baa), confirmed by two rating services . 
Priorities in the use of bank funds 
At this point, a discussion of priorities in the use of bank 
funds should prove extremely useful in understanding the proper place of 
the investment activities of a typical commercial bank. The general 
priorities usually accepted are as follows: * 
1. Primar.y reserves (cash) 
2. Secondary reserves 
3. Customer credit demands (loans) 
4. Open-market investment for income. 
*3, PP• 12-18. 
From this list of priorities, the concept most relevant to 
this discussion is the fact that loans take precedence over investments. 
Once the primary and secondary reserves (safety features) have been taken 
care of, loan demand comes next. This is so because banks are better 
suited for this type of market than they are for the investment market. 
Loans are the area where a banker should take most of his risks and make 
most of his profit. Investment income should enter the picture only after 
the first three priorities are taken care of. In the survey of current 
practices, one question# referred specifically to this area. Bankers were 
asked to establish a priority for the employment of commercial bank funds. 
Without exception, the above list of priorities was established. 
The questionnaire also tackled the problem of priorities among 
the obligations of an investment portfolio. Here again there was general 
agreement. The priorities generally agreed upon were: 
1. Safety of funds (quality). 
2. Availability of funds (liquidity). 
3. Earnings (profitability). 
In establishing this group of priorities, one runs into the 
financial problem of liquidity versus profitability. The more liquid a 
financial institution is, the less profitable it is; and the more pro-
fitable an institution is, the less liquid it becomes. In the case of 
commercial banks, liquidity comes out on top because of their investment 
requirements. However, the crux of the situation is not the fact that 
#Questionnaire, Section H on p. 2 of Part II. 
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liquidity bests profitability as an objective; instead, it is the 
maintenance of the proper balance between liquidity and profitability 
in each individual bank. This is something that can be properly decided 
only by the management of the bank concerned. 
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CHAPTER III. 
FORMULATION OF BANK INVESTMENT POLICY 
The subject of this chapter is the formulation of bank 
investment policy. Many financial writers are of the opinion that this 
aspect of investment portfolio management has been seriously neglected by 
many of our banking institutions . Furthermore, general investzoont policy 
is easier to develop than loan policy because ever.y bank has access to 
the entire bond market, while local loan policies have to be developed in 
relation to the opportunities which unfold in the area served by the bank. 
Generally speaking, an "investment policy" is a program for the 
use of a bank's funds which are not loaned to its customers. Although 
this discussion is confined mainly to investments in securities, other 
types of bank investments (e . g. , mortgages) should not be slighted. 
Situation of the individual bank 
The purpose of shaping an investment policy is to reduce the 
guesswork in handling an investment portfolio. Moreover, if the program 
of an individual bank is to serve the needs of that bank, it must be based 
on the situation of that bank. Therefore, there are certain basic studies 
that a portfolio manager should make (on a continuing basis, if need be) 
before committing his investment funds to the market. Some of the more 
important subjects which require analysis are: 
27 
(1) A study of the general type and character of 
the business of the bank. The desired end result 
here is a picture of the kind of bank one is working 
with (e.g., a savings bank that has evolved into a 
coJ!Dllercial bank). 
(2) Information concerning the deposits of the bank. 
Which funds are temporary and what percentage of a 
bank's deposits may be considered normal? What is the 
make-up of the time deposits? What is the seasonal 
variation of the deposits, and how do cyclical 
conditions affect the various t,ypes of deposits? 
(3) The volume and character of the bank's loans. 
(4) The tax position of the bank. Before any move 
of importance is made in the portfolio, the tax 
resultsshould be considered. 
(5) The margin of safety provided by the capital 
accounts. 
( 6) The current business situation and a forecast of 
what business conditions are likely to be s:ix months 
to a year from now. This, of course, is an external 
study, but it is an area the knowledge about 'Vhich 
can make the difference between average and excellent , 
portfolio performance. 
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One interesting observation during the survey was that many 
portfolio managers were constantly working toward better reporting in 
the areas listed above. The inference here is that as the business 
climate in which a commercial bank operates becomes more dynamic (as is 
the trend today), additional management effort needs to be channeled in 
this direction. 
Goal of bank investment programs 
The first step in the formulation of a bank's investment policy 
should be the establishment of a goal. In the last section of Chapter II, 
the elements of such a goal were outlined: (a) safety; (b) liquidity; 
and (c) profitabilit.y. Since all of these play a part, the objective 
becomes a compromise. One authorit.y on bank management stated it in this 
fashion: u. • • the goal is really a compromise of maximum income consis-
tent with commercial bank safety and maximum flexibility in investment 
position."* Evidence obtained during the survey points to a deduction 
that a1 though bankers are thinking along these lines, very few of them have 
formulated a definite objective. In spite of the fact that a goal should 
change as conditions change, it is the opinion of this writer that more 
thinking needs to be continuously directed at fundamentals such as this. 
Basic principles in the formulation of investment policy 
In 1939 the New York State Bankers Association sponsored a 
series of conferences on bond portfolios. In the first conference, one 
~-3, P• 28.5. 
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of the speakers discussed a "Statement of Principles and Standards of 
Investment for Commercial Banks" issued by the Bank Management Commission 
of the American Bankers Association in 1937.* These principles appear 
to be ever.r bit as important today as they were then. Following a 
sununary of these principles, there will be a comparison of these standards 
with what is happening today. The principles are as follows: 
(1) Every bank should adopt a definite written 
investment policy to meet its particular situation. 
This policy should be approved by the Board of 
Directors. 
(2) Each bank should fix the responsibility for 
carrying out its policy on one officer . 
(3) A bank's liquidit.y should be provided for by 
means of a secondary reserve account of high-grade, 
short-term maturities . 
(4) A separate investment account of prime longer-
termed spaced maturities should be established to 
provide additional income. 
As far as the first principle is concerned, it is the exception 
rather than the rule for a bank today to have its investment policy in 
written form. Even those banks that have made some attempt in this 
direction often have only part of their investment policy written out. 
Lack of a written policy may not adversely affect the large bank where 
*10, PP• 27-39. 
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there is available the teamwork of perhaps a dozen officers. In fact, 
the larger the bank, the more flexible its investment policy can be. 
The portfolio manager of a large bank often attempts to change his 
program in accordance w.i.th changing market conditions. However, the 
country banker usually cannot afford to do this because of lack of 
training and money market experience. Such a bank should have a short 
written policy. Once such a program is mapped out, the small bank should 
follow it and fight "What sociologists call the "herding instinct" - the 
tendency to do what others are doing at the moment. For example, the 
small bank that had established a spaced maturity program in its separate 
investment account and had resisted the pressure for "shorts" during the 
latter part of the recent period of rising loan demand, would have made 
out very well, capital appreciation-wise,follorr.ing the 1957-58 downturn 
in interest rates. Although it is easy to look back and suggest how 
things "should have been done", it is almost always the small banker who 
cannot afford to do this. The small bank portfolio will usually show a 
better performance over the long run, if the portfolio manager adheres to 
an established policy through the ups and downs of the business cycle. 
Principle number two suggests that the overall responsibility 
for carrying out portfolio policy should be vested in one officer. 
Questionnaire answers show that this is usually the case. Investment 
decisions are almost alvmys the responsibility of one individual, but 
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an investment committee (either a committee or the board of directors) 
helps by doing the staff work and presenting recommendations . 
The remaining principles ~11 be discussed in another 
chapter. 
Additional observations 
As an aid in formulating bank investment policy, it appears 
as if the smaller banks seldom seek the advice of their larger city 
correspondents. The city correspondents, on the other hand, are willing 
and well equipped to handle requests for investment advice. As so often 
happens, the small banker only comes for help after the damage has been 
done . Vfuatever the case, this avenue of investment guidance could be much 
better utilized than it has been in the past . 
In addition to regular~ published information and correspondents, 
bankers occasional~ consult government bond dealers regarding specific 
market information. However, When this is done the banker should realize 
that the broker often cannot escape his own bias. Advice coming from this 
source should always be sifted with this in mind. 
As far as determining what brokers receive the business of a 
bank, it appears as if two considerations are involved. One is Whether or 
not the brokerage house carries an account with the bank. The other is 
the extent to which the broker in question aids the bank (e . g. , by 
rendering timely market information) . 
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Another observation concerns the "rules of thumb" or general 
standards used by banks in selecting their investments. Some banks, in 
regard to corporate and municipal obligations, follow the policy of 
buying nothing but double A names and above. Other banks limit their 
purchases to single A names and above and make a majority of their pur-
chases in the single A category. Almost none of the larger banks have 
been buying any corporate issues at all and many banks are planning to 
let those that they do have run off. In regard to "municipals", some 
banks follow a policy of sticking to names in their own area (e.g., the 
New England area). Few of the larger banks rely heavily on the ratings 
of the agencies in making purchases within their own area. All banks 
appear to use agency ratings cautiously. However, the reader should be 
vmrned that these observations were made during a period of rising loan 
demand when most bankers were allo~ng their portfolios (mainly their 
secondary reserves) to run off in order to secure additional loan funds. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO AND COMMERCIAL BANK LIQUIDITY 
Liquidity, the ability to convert assets into cash at a 
moment's notice without loss,# is one of the foremost considerations in 
the development of investment policy. For more than twenty years, 
commercial baru{s have experienced an exorbitant amount of liquidit,y. 
During the past few years, however, this situation has changed. Loan-
deposit ratios have been in a steep climb. In effect, loans have increased 
at the expense of the secondary reserves. When asked what issue their bank 
considered most critical during the period of this investigation, almost 
every bank official questioned replied that liquidity was the issue that 
had concerned them most. The purpose of the chapter will be to show why 
commercial banks need liquidity and the function of the secondary reserve 
assets as a source of liquidity. 
Why commercial banks need liquiditz 
There are two basic reasons why liquidit,y is essential to 
commercial banks. One is to provide f or deposit decline. The other is 
to meet loan demands. An additional reason is to be able to take advan-
tage of favorable investment opportunities that may arise. 
Because commercial banks are legally required to meet most of 
their obligations on demand (e . g. , demand deposits), liquidity policy 
#or, the ability to shift from one asset to another without loss . 
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should be constructed in such a manner that a bank will be able to cope 
with foreseeable deposit losses without: (a) extraordinary capital 
losses, (b) curtailment of loans, or (c) excessive borrowing from outside 
sources (e . g. , the Federal Reserve) . At times these deposit variations 
can be anticipated (e . g. , seasonal deposit shifts), but this is not always 
the case. Because some t,ypes of deposits (e . g. , deposits of public funds) 
are more likely to be withdrawn suddenly than others, each bank investment 
officer must have a thorough knowledge of his bank's deposit structure . 
The second reason for protective liquidit,y policy is to avoid 
disturbing a bank's loaning operations when cash drains develop. If a 
bank does not have an adequate secondary reserve, loans may have to be 
cut back in times of stress . This is a situation that every banker trys 
to avoid . Only when a bank is able to meet all reasonable loan demands 
is it fulfilling the basic reason for its existence . For example, had 
larger liquidity reserves been available during the early thirties, many 
loan losses could have been avoided, since banks that were pressed for 
cash would not have had to press for loan liquidation. 
In addition to these reasons, a bank which happened to have a 
strong liquid position would be able to participate in any favorable 
investment opportunities that might come along. This, of course, is not 
a compelling reason for maintaining liquidity, but since liquidit,y is 
needed, every bank should attempt to make the best of the framework within 
which it is forced to operate . 
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Secondary reserves as a source of liquidity 
Earning assets - loans and investments - contribute to cash 
availability in three ways: (a) through maturities of loan and invest-
ments; (b) by a high degree of marketability; and (c) through rediscount 
eligibility or acceptability as loan collateral. 
The situation today is such that banks rely mainly on their 
secondary reserve account for liquidity. Traditional banking theory held 
that banks could maintain their liquidity by concentrating on short-term 
business loans. Experience did not bear out this theory. As a result, 
conservative banking 'practice of today dictates that loans should not be 
counted as part of the secondary reserves . However, many of the larger 
banks still reg~rd street loans (e . g. , call loans to brokers) as a part 
of their protective investments . 
The reliance on the secondary reserves of a bank for the bulk of 
its liquidity is another reason Why careful consideration must be given 
to the selection of a bank's securities. Since the determinants of in-
vestment liquidity are maturity, quality and marketability, all securities 
selected for the secondary reserve account must contain these qualities . 
These factors will be discussed further iri connection with the securities 
suitable for commercial bank investment. 
Vfuen the secondary reserves of a bank are properly established, 
they will be available at all times to replenish not only the primary 
reserves (cash and due) but also all other predictable and expected demands. 
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But, since no two banks are alike, it is impossible to arrive at aqy 
uniform standard by which to determine the minimum amount of secondary 
reserves needed. However, the factors that each individual bank must 
consider in evaluating its liquidity needs include: (a) the bank's 
deposit structure, (b) the quality and maturities of its loans and 
non-secondary-reserve investments, (c) the capital position of the bank, 
and (d) the economic trends affecting its community. 
Liquidity versus profitability 
Too little liquidity may subject a bank to undue hazards. On 
the other hand, an excessive amount of liquidity can easily result in 
needless sacrifice of bank earnings as well as neglect of the legitimate 
credit requirements of the community concerned. What is needed is a 
"middle road" that provides a satisfactory compromise of both objectives. 
This "middle road rr will vary from time to time as the business 
cycle progresses through its various phases. During the "recession" 
and "depression" phases, commercial banks typically build up an in-
creasing amount of protective liquidity. As the "recovery" and 
"prosperity" phases roll around, this excess liquidity is largely worked 
off. The problem that each individual bank has to solve is that of 
determining not only what liquidity is needed at the moment but, more 
important, the amount of liquidity that will be needed the next six to 
twelve months. 
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Liquidity policy becomes especially important in periods of 
rising loan demand, such as the economy has just passed through. At 
such times a banker can be subjected to these two conflicting pressures: 
(a) pressure to deplete his secondary reserves in order to satisfy 
customer credit demands (profitability); and (b) the need for main-
taining enough secondary reserves to make sure that the bank can meet 
its obligations on demand (liquidity) . This peak period of business 
cycle activity is a very critical one because commercial banking 
experience has shown that a rapid increase in loans and a corresponding 
decrease of liquid reserves exposes a bank to the danger of sudden cash 
drains which often happen on the downside of the business cycle. 
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CHAPTER V. 
SECONDARY :RESERVES 
The primary objective of this chapter is to point out the 
policies banks are currently following in this area. However, before 
this can be accomplished, the reader should be exposed to a discussion 
of the purpose and function of secondary reserves in commercial banking. 
Eurpose and division of seconda£Y reserves 
Because of the nature of bank deposits and the character of 
loan demands, secondary reserves are needed to act as a reservoir, 
ready at all times to fulfill a bank's expected and remote liquidity 
needs. As previously indicated, quality and liquidity are the top 
priorities in this area, but profitability enters the picture to the 
extent of the risks involved in the purchase of a bank's securities. 
As is usually the case, a bank's secondary reserves are divided 
up into two major divisions. One is a secondary reserve of highly 
liquid securities, and the other a tertiary reserve# of longer-term 
issues. These reserves are generally thought of as the "investment 
portfolio" of a bank. 
Seconda~ reserve 
The basic purpose of the secondary reserve is to act, 
"· •• as a bellows, contracting as deposits decline or loans increase 
#sometimes termed the "investment core", the "investment account" 
or "secondary reserves, Class II11 • 
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and expanding as deposits increase or loans decline."* The issue to 
be discussed next is the extent to which practice today follows the 
basic theory in this area. 
As was noted in previous chapters, one of the basic principles 
in the formulation of investment policy is that the secondary reserve 
account should provide for a bank's liquidity. This is normally done by 
investing secondary reserve funds in short-term "governments" and other 
securities maturing within two to three years. Questionnaire results 
indicate that theory and practice in this segment of portfolio management 
are not far apart. Ever.y bank visited had its investment portfolio 
divided into two major divisions similar to those discussed above. 
Separate policies were applied to each division, and the liquidity of 
the secondary reserve was provided for by highly marketable, short-term 
securities. However, the 1954- 157 period of rising loan demand and 
increasing interest rates caused at least one re-evaluation of portfolio 
policy. 
Since the Federal Reserve-Treasury accord in 1951, many bankers 
had not been too certain as to what maturities should be considered as 
falling within the secondary reserve. As indicated, one of the accepted 
maturity limits was up to three years. Then, along came the recent period 
of rising interest rates and falling bond prices, the duration and inten-
sity of Which few bankers correctly predicted. The result was that 
*7, P• 20. 
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towards the end of this period many banks found it necessary to sell 
off a nmtiber of their bonds in the secondary reserve account to meet 
the increased loan demand. The "eye-opener" was that bond prices for 
this maturity range had fallen well below what the banks had anticipated. 
This caused many banks to take greater capital losses in their investment 
accounts than they would have preferred. The implication here is that no 
bonds Ydth maturities of over two years should be included within the 
secondary reserve and, if possible, the bulk of the maturities should be 
closer to one year than two . 
Tertia~ reserve 
The remainder of the investment portfolio, the tertiary reserve, 
may be considered the more permanent part of the investment account. 
After a bank has decided upon the size of the secondary reserve, the 
rest of the investments fall within this "investment core" . Although 
liquidity is still a consideration, greater emphasis may be placed upon 
' 
income . 
In order to hedge against changing interest rates, the maturities 
of this investment account should be fairly evenly staggered over a 
period of years - usually ten years . The question as to the number of 
years that a maturity schedule should be restricted to is one that should 
be determined individually by each bank, based on its local conditions . 
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However, most authorities recommend that the maximum length be 
confined to ten years, except in rare circumstances, such as when a 
bank in a small community with a light loan demand is compelled to 
purchase larger maturities to provide necessary income. 
Every bank visited during the survey had adopted this principle 
of having a separate investment account for the purpose of additional 
income. But, uniformity regarding maturity policy was not very widespread. 
The most widely adopted policy was the ten year "ladder effect».# One 
bank evenly spaced its tertiary reserve maturities out to five years. 
Another bank stated its maturity policy as follows: "Our objective is 
an evenly spaced maturity pattern with the amount maturing in each year 
detennined by the average projected growth in loans. 11 This bank had some 
maturities over the ten year mark. Still another bank evenly spaced its 
"governments" out to six years and its "municipals" out to nine years. 
All indications are that the ten year "ladder effectn is almost 
ideal for the small bank. The even spacing gives an opportunity for a 
periodic "second look" at the market and reduces the annual work load 
in this area. For the larger, better staffed institutions, other more 
flexible policies can prove to be more rewarding. One suggestion is to 
divide the tertiary reserve into two parts, each being a five year area. 
As the funds roll over, invest in the more profitable maturities in 
# Maturities even~ spaced out to ten years. 
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each area, at the same time, trying to keep the fund fairly well balanced. 
This policy requires more skillful handling and more time must be 
devoted to analyzing market conditions . 
One question in the survey concerned the average year-end 
maturity of the various investment portfolios for the years 1954 
through 1957 . The results show that the figure for any one bank did 
not vary substantially over this period. The mean for all banks visited 
was roughly three years - six months . The low for a single bank was two 
years, and the high for any one bank was about four years - six months. 
One correlation noted was that the average maturity was shorter in the 
"high-loan" banks .# 
# Banks having a high percentage of their deposits in loans . 
CHAPTER VI. 
TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SECURITIES 
SUITABLE FOR COBMEilCIAL BANK INVESTMENT 
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This chapter will explore the securities suitable for coliDllercial 
bank investment in the order of their importance. Also, an attempt will 
be made to indicate the position each type of security should have in a 
typical investment portfolio. 
During the course of the investment survey, there is one prin-
ciple that almost every bank investment officer stated or implied in the 
replies to the questionnaire. It was the idea that of the three major 
obligations of an investment portfolio - qualit,y, liquidity and 
profitability# - quality is the one priority that should never be compro-
mised. However, continuing emphasis in this area does not mean that 
investment liquidit,y (via marketability and proper maturities) should be 
slighted in any way. Both have their place just as income objectives do 
also, but one can never emphasize too often that the loan portfolio - and 
not the investment portfolio - is the place where a bank should take its 
quali t,y (or credit) risks. 
Direct obligations of the United States Treasury ("governments") 
Only marketable United States Treasury securities (see Table II) 
will be discussed here. Non- marketable government obligations (e . g. , 
# See Section E of Chapter II. 
TABLE TI . 
T,rpes of Securities Suitable for Commercial 
Bank Investment in Order of Importance 
I . Direct Obligations of the United States Trea~ 
A. u.s. Treasury Bills 
B. u.s. Treasury Certificates of Indebtedness 
C. u.s. Treasury Notes 
D. u.s. Treasury Bonds 
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II . Securities of the Instrumentalities of the United States Government: 
A. Federal Intermediate Credit Banks 
B. Federal Home Loan Banks 
c. Federal Land Banks 
D. Federal National Mortgage Association 
E. Banks for Cooperatives 
III. Municipal and Other Tax Free Obligations 
A. General Obligation Bonds 
B. Housing Authority Bonds 
C. Revenue Bonds 
IV . Corporate Bonds 
A. Railroad Equipment Trust Certificates 
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Savings Notes and Bonds), found only to a modest extent in bank portfolios, 
will not be considered. With but few exceptions, all marketable 11govern-
mentsll are subject to Federal Income Taxes . 
United States Government securities excel all others in quantity, 
volume or availabilit,r and marketability and, therefore, are held in bank 
portfolios in great quantity. Since these securities will, undoubtedly, 
always be paid promptly and in full, there is no credit risk involved in 
holding them. However, there is a market or interest rate risk to be taken 
into account. For these reasons, the issues that require the most atten-
tion here are: (a) What maturities best fit the needs of the bank in 
question? (b) What is the future outlook for interest rates? 
Treasury Bills may have a maturity of up to one year but are 
generally confined to a maturity of 90 to 92 days . Since bills are sold 
on an auction basis, .holders of maturing series have no privilege of 
exchange . Certificates are limited to a maturit.y of one year, and holders 
of maturing certificates are usually given the privilege of exchanging 
them for such securities as the Treasury may be offering to refund them. 
Treasury Notes, when offered, have original maturities from one to five 
years . Holders are given the same exchange privileges as the holders of 
certificates . Treasury Bonds are issued with maturities greater than 
five years but usually less then twenty-five years. In respect to ex-
change privileges, they are similar to the certificates and notes. 
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(The interest rate picture and forecasting will be taken up 
in another section of this paper) . 
Because government bonds best satisfy the safety and liquidit,y 
requirements of commercial banks, investment theorists have long advocated 
that they should make up the bulk of the investment portfolios of these 
banks . Survey results do not disagree . A majority of the banks questioned 
indicated that Treasury obligations made up from 85 to 90 percent of their 
portfolios . In some cases, government bonds made up only 70 to 75 per-
cent of a bank's investments, but this was only noted in the larger banks 
which had especially active municipal departments . 
For the small bank, Treasury obligations provide an especially 
good avenue for a high percentage of its investment funds. Not only is 
the investment officer of a small bank often pressed for time but, more 
important, he often lacks the investment experience necessary to safely 
invest a sizeable portion of his bank ' s funds in other types of securities . 
Survey results confirmed this logic . 
Securities of the instrumentalities of the United States Government 
tuagency bonds")* 
While 11agency bonds" cannot be considered as falling within the 
"riskless" asset category that government bonds do, they are not far 
behind. These securities (see Table II) are issued by Federal agencies, 
created by Act of Congress to fulfill a definite need within the national 
*8, pp. 79-81. 
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economy. These agencies are supervised by the Federal Government, 
and the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury is needed in all 
ageney financing. These facts indicate a high credit rating. The 
bonds of all of these agencies, except those of Federal Land Banks, 
have been approved by the regulating authorities for bank investment 
without special restriction. Federal Land Bank bonds are eligible for 
bank investment with special restriction. All of these securities are 
subject to Federal Income Taxes. 
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks finance their operations 
through the sale of "consolidated collateral trust debentures." They 
are permitted to issue these debentures with maturities up to five years, 
but nine months or less is the usual ma"b.lrity length. Federal Home Loan 
Banks sell "consolidated notes" with maturities usually less than one 
year to finance their obligations. Federal Land Banks are financed by 
the public sale of "consolidated Federal Fann Loan Bonds" whose maturities 
vary from a few months to 15 years. The Federal National Mortgage 
Association was created to fulfill three functions and the association 
has used varying methods of financing to carry out its missions. Periodic 
sale of "consolidated debentures" has been the principal source of financing 
for the Banks for Cooperatives. Four issues are currently outstanding. 
Since questionnaire results indicated that this class of security 
has been largely ignored by commercial banks, discussing (With bank 
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investment officers) the place of "agency bondstt in investment portfolios 
was an interesting experience . In view of the desirability of holding 
the lion's share of a bank's investment funds in government bonds, it 
was agreed that "quasi-governments" (as 11agencybonds" are sometimes 
called) should only play a minor role . However, this was about the only 
area of agreement. The investment officers of the larger banks seemed 
to feel that "agency bonds" were a good investment for the small bank 
that was not interested in short-term trading . On the other hand, the 
smaller banks usually held very few "quasi-governments" (if any at all) 
and generally felt that they did not want them. One of their reasons for 
not liking them was that holding this type of security unduly increased 
their reporting load. Others did not like their marketability. 
After sifting the opinions of many sources, the facts appear 
to be that the marketability of "agency bonds" has gained a great deal 
in recent years . In fact, they are often more marketable than many 
municipal obligations . For the small bank they can provide a good means 
of investing their funds. Their yields are often attractive, and the 
risk of holding them is relatively minor. However, for banks that en-
gage in a considerable amount of arbitrage, these are not a preferred 
type of investment. 
Municipal and other tax free obligations 
Municipal bonds, or "municipals", rank third in importance as 
bank investments . These bonds are public securities issued by states, 
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counties, municipalities and other political subdivisions. Anot her way 
of expressing this would be to say that "municipals" are securities 
issued by political subdivisions other than the Federal Government. 
One of the attractive features of these securities is that the 
income produced from holding them is exempt from Federal Taxes. For 
this reason, municipal bonds are often referred to as "tax exempts"• 
Another favorable feature is that there is usually a large supply of 
these securities available. The credit risk factor may be reduced by 
careful screening of this ample supply. A record of prompt payment as 
well as an opportunity for broad diversification are also in their favor. 
In addition, a wide choice of maturities helps to explain why many bankers 
are attracted to this type of securit,y. 
On the other side of the picture, the marketability of these 
bonds is not always the best. A market of close two-way trading is the 
exception instead of the rule. For this reason, these securities are 
usually purchased with the assumption that they will be held to maturity. 
Today, municipal bonds are classified into three categories: 
(a) General Obligation Bonds, (b) Housing Authority Bonds, and (c) Revenue 
Bonds. 
General Obligation Bonds are direct obligations of the issuing 
authority backed by its general taxing power. This feature is the reason 
why these bonds are the "nrunicipalsu most in demand. They are usually 
issued in serial form, repayment of principal provided for either 
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semi- annually or annually. Housing Authority Bonds are the newest 
category of municipal bonds on the market. These are of a very high 
credit grade because repayment is backed by the pledge of the Federal 
Government's full faith md credit. These bonds were first offered in 
July of 1951. Revenue Bonds are secured only by the income or revenues 
derived from the operation of a specific facilit,y for which they are 
issued (e . g. , a toll road) . No taxing powers are pledged as securit,r 
and therefore, they cannot be regarded in the same light as the other 
two categories of municipals . 
Survey results indicate that bankers favor General Obligation 
Bonds by a wide margin. Smaller banks appear to limit the small amount 
of "municipals" they carry almost entirely to this category of municipal 
bonds . Larger banks that had approximately 15 percent of their port-
folios in "municipals" stated that General Obligation Bonds returned a 
higher yield than Housing Authority Bonds, but that the latter were more 
marketable . Some banks considered Housing Authority Bonds advantageous 
for 11tax switching" . Very few Revenue Bonds were held by any of the 
banks . In concluding, a ranking of municipal bonds in the order of their 
importance, liquidity-wide, would be: (a) Housing Authority Bonds, 
(b) General Obligation Bonds, and (c) Revenue Bonds . 
Corporate bonds ( 11corporates"l 
Corporate bonds are those bonds issued by private corporations. 
In spite of the fact that there is a sufficient supply of these bonds 
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which might qualify credit-wise, the t,ype of bond is the least 
attractive for bank investment. Questionnaire results indicate that 
almost all banks are allowing their 11corporatestt to run-off, with the 
intention of reinvesting such funds in other t.ypes of bonds. However, 
there is one issue in this category that is often utilized for bank 
investment, namely, Railroad Eguipment Trust Certificates . The reasons 
for this are: (a) Their favorable history of earning which have provided 
an adequate margin of safety; (b) the fact that they are a prior claim 
on railroad operating income (almost equal with wages); and (c) because 
they are generally issued in semi-annual serial maturity form. But, 
because of their limited marketability (especially in times of stress), 
these securities are usually purchased with the idea of keeping them to 
maturity. 
CHAPTER VII. 
ECONOMIC FORECASTING AND THE INVFSTMENT PORTFOLIO 
Market fluctuations# may be a source of financial rewards, 
but they may also be a source of great penalties. For these reasons, 
no financial manager should consider himself fully informed without some 
information (and planning) in regard to future probabilities. It follows 
that economic forecasting has a place in investment portfolio management. 
However, there is no fool-proof formula that maybe relied upon for 
accurate prediction. Past economic history may serve as a guide, and 
general rules may prove to be helpful, but economic events may never be 
depended upon to repeat themselves in exactly the same manner. This is 
so because all the factors shaping the respective outcomes are con-
tinually changing. This chapter w.i.ll point out the part economic fore-
casting can play in portfolio management. 
Economic forecasts ernplozed in investment portfolio management 
Some of the more important economic forecasts that are of impor-
tance in this area are: (a) Funds position projections of various 
lengths up to a year; (b) secondary reserve position forecasts of various 
lengths up to a year; and (c) a continuous forecast of general business 
conditions. 
# Since bank portfolios are made up of high-grade bonds, interest 
rate fluctuations are one of the primary concerns. 
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Funds position projections relate to the legally required 
reserves that ever,y commercial bank is required to maintain on deposit 
with the Federal Reserve. Although this topic will not be pursued 
further in this paper, there is no intent to imply that this area lacks 
importance. A well managed bank must keep fully invested at all times. 
Excess reserves mean loss of potential earnings, something that no 
banker wants to make a practice of allowing. 
Secondary reserve position forecasts are needed because a bank 
portfolio manager has to supply funds to the loaning officers when needed 
and take up the slack when loan demand lessens. Economic projections 
allow this to be accomplished in an orderly fashion. Table III illus-
trates one method of estimating the future size of the secondary reserve 
for a hypothetical bank. Three-month projections are used. 
The steps in making this type of forecast are as follows: 
(a) Estimate deposits (line 1); (b) estimate loans (line 3); (c) estimate 
municipals (or tertiary reserve) (line 4); (d) estimate cash requirements 
(30 percent of deposits in this case) (line 2); (e) add in any other 
assets (line 5); (f) take a total (line 6); (g) determine liabilities, 
capital being known and deposits already estimated (lines 10 and 11); 
(h) include net current liabilities (line 9); (i) take a total (line 12); 
(j) place total liabilities figure in line 8 (total assets); and (k) 
subtract line 6 from line 8. This figure (line 7), a residual, represents 
the amount available for the secondary reserve. Then, the bank investment 
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TABLE III. 
Three-Month Secondary Reserve Position 
Forecasts for Bank XYZ 
Bank XY'Z (In Millions of Dollars) 
9/30/57 12/30/57 6/30/58 
Line 1. Deposits 165.3 180.0 150.0 
Assets 
2. Cash and due $ 43.8 $ 54.0 $ 45.0 
3. Loans 103.9 100.0 95.0 
4. Municipals 17.3 8.0 15.0 
5. Other 4.1 4.0 4.0 
6. 169.1 166.0 159.0 
7. Secondary 
Reserve 21.1 18.5 15.5 
8. Total $190.2 $204.5 $174.5 
Liabilities 
9. Net current 6.6 6.0 6.0 
10. Deposits 165.3 180.0 150.0 
n. Capital 18.3 18.5 18.5 
12. Total $190.2 $204.5 $174.5 
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officer, knowing the amount of money available for investment purposes, 
acts accordingly. Should this amount be insufficient for the liquidity 
needs of the bank, there is time to take appropriate action. Before 
leaving this topic, one should note the important part that several 
other projections play in this liquidity forecast . Estimates of the 
secondary reserve position can only be as accurate as the projections 
of the deposit and loan trends are . 
Bankers are always interested in interest rate movements because 
of the vulnerability of their high- grade bonds . Survey results indicate 
that most banks forecast interest rate trends on the basis of the general 
business outlook. In doing this, an assumption is made that Federal 
Reserve policy is based on the same outlook. None of the banks visited 
stated that they ever tried to "second guess" the Federal Reserve Board. 
Any action the bankers took in regards to lengthening or shortening their 
portfolios were always in accordance with the outlook for general business 
and not on the basis of what they thought the Federal Reserve would do. 
The portfolio managers of the larger banks maintained a constant 
check on various economic indicies in their efforts to chart the business 
outlook. The executives of the smaller banks, on the other hand, stated 
that they usually relied upon regularly published secondary sources (e . g. , 
The Wall Street Journal) . All bankers viewed this area as being extremely 
important. To emphasize this, many pointed out that if they had correctly 
estimated the intensity and duration of the recent "tight-moneytr period, 
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they would have: (a) Moved sooner to provide larger secondary reserves; 
and (b) engaged in more "tax switching" (this subject is explained in 
the next chapter) . This information all points to the idea that 
economic forecasting is no longer a convenience, it is a definite necessity. 
Significance of zield curves 
The tenn "yield curve" refers to a chart showing the different 
yields of bond issues of varying maturities as of a particular date .# 
The three curves shown in Chart III illustrate the basic patterns of these 
various curves . 
Curve A in Chart III is typical of the pattern which prevailed 
in most years from 1907 through 1929 and is known as a ndecreasing yield 
curve . " Curve B, an 11increasing yield curve 11 , has been in evidence almost 
continually since 1931. The "flat yield curve 11 , Curve c, represents the 
pattern of an approximate~ horizontal line. This pattern existed between 
1901 and 1905, as well as during the early part of 1957. * 
In addition to using yield curves in determining the relative 
attractiveness of buying or selling particular bond issues, investment 
theorists have stated that the existence of rate patterns "· •• has two 
important implications for the investment analyst: (a) The possibility 
of 'playing the pattern', or investing and w.i thdrawing investments at 
various levels; (b) the use of the shape of the curve to guide investment 
maturity policy . u-r"* 
# If issues of differing tax status are included, all issues should be 
reduced to a basis of yield net after taxes so as to be comparable . 
{~12 , Part III • 
.;.~~3, P • 325. 
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CHART III . 
The Three General Types of Yield Curves 
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Source : Your Bank--Its Deposits and Its Investments, p . 56. 
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When there is an upsweeping yield curve (similar to Curve B 
in Chart Ill) investment writers have pointed out the possibility of 
adding to a bank's income by investing for "selected segments" in the 
existing yield pattern (especially if government bonds are "pegged1r# as 
was the case during World '\'far IT). For example, if a bank should buy 
a 20-year bond with a 2~ percent coupon at par, the yield is 2! percent 
if the security is held to maturity. If an upsweeping yield curve exists 
and there is no change in the curve during this period, the market yield 
of the bond falls as time passes. If the 15-year yield to maturity is 
2 percent, the bond is worth $106.45 for each $100 of par after 5 years. 
Should the bank now sell the bond, it has received coupons at 2! percent 
for each year and it has a capital gain of $6.45. For the 5-year period 
from the twentieth year to the fifteenth, the effective yield from 
maturity is approximately .3-3/4 percent.* 
This operation is only feasible, however, for the investor who 
is not concerned with liquidity to the extent that commercial banks are 
and can affor d to sell their bonds before maturity and reinvest the funds 
at the long end of the market (e.g., insurance companies). 
Financial writers have also noted that yield curves can be 
useful in shaping a bank 1 s maturity policy. In examining the prevailing 
yield curve, advocates of this viewpoint suggest that a banker should 
look for the approximate section of the curve where it noticeably bends 
# The government attempted to keep the market price of government bonds 
at a certain figure by freely buying and selling as circumstances 
demanded. 
*.3, P• .326. 
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and make his purchases in this area . This is because the banker is 
seeking as much earning power as possible without undue risk of capital . 
Out to the bend of the yield curve, the steepness (if there is any) 
means that the banker is being paid for the added maturity risk . Beyond 
the bend of the curve, the marginal compensation for the additional 
maturity risk is continually diminishing. 
Some autl1orities have also endeavored to promote the yield curve 
as a forecasting device, but this use has been almost entirely disproved 
by experience . For example, the "increasing yield curve" was explained 
as a forecast of ultimately higher long-term interest rates, but the 
long length of the period during which the long rates remained low, cast 
·, 
considerable doubt upon the concept . Replies to the questionnaire appear 
to bear this out. Almost all banks surveyed stated that they did not use 
yield curves in their forecasting . 
As suggested above, survey results indicate that yield curves 
no longer hold the position of importance that they did formerly. Some 
use is made of yield curves in forming a bank ' s maturity policy, but 
this is not widely heralded. However, questionnaire results did establish 
that the principal use of yield curves by commercial banks today is in 
determining the relative attraction, or lack of attraction, of individual 
bond issues that they are interested in buying or selling. 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
This chapter will take up three additional areas of portfolio 
management. The first topic to be explored will be "diversification". 
"Trading" will be covered next, followed by a discussion of "bond losses 
of banks." 
Diversification 
Investment diversification is the idea of spreading investment 
risks over an area sufficiently w.i.de so that losses will be reduced to 
the average experience of many securities. As applied to investment port-
folio management, the function of diversification is to obtain the 
greatest possible separation of risks peculiar to different industries, 
to different geographical areas and to different types of issuers. 
However, since diversification applies only to investments which are not 
"riskless," United States Government securities are excluded from this 
discussion; so are "agency bonds" for the most part. Thus, in the true 
sense of the word, diversification really applies to only whatever 
"municipals" and 11corporates" a bank portfolio may contain. In view of 
these facts, one may logically conclude that diversification plays but a 
small part in actual portfolio management. In this respect, survey 
results agree. 
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Only one of the banks surveyed indicated that it had a 
definite policy in this area. This bank stated that it attempted to 
apply geographical diversification to its municipal holdings. On the 
other hand, another bank (and one that deals rather heavily in "municipals") 
frankly stated that it made little effort to apply the principal of geo-
graphical diversification to its portfolio investments. This bank pointed 
out that the bulk of its municipal holdings are Massachusetts names because 
the bank is better acquainted with the risks in its home state . On the 
vmole, discussion of this topic, during the survey, brought forth little 
enthusiasm. 
J,;ading 
The term trading, as used in this paper, will mean "buying and 
selling of bank investments for short-term gain. 11 This discussion will 
not apply to the buying and selling that a bank engages in during the 
course of its normal investment operations. 
With the fl~xible monetary policy that the Federal Reserve Board 
bas employed since 1951, it is possible to move in and out of "governments" 
and other high- grade securities, accumulating capital gains (which are 
taxed at only 25%) . Yet, one should remember that a single mistake can 
easily involve a loss greater than the profit of a half dozen other moves . 
Also, a banker can be right in theory, but wrong as far as timing is 
concerned. 
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Some authorities believe that a banker's approach to his 
portfolio is either that of a trader or that of a long-term investor. 
This school of thought believes that it cannot be both. 
Generally speaking, there are three different situations in 
which there is some excuse for a commercial bank to engage in trading: 
" . • • (a) making a market in the municipal issues that which a bank has 
underwritten; (b) arbitrage transactions,# particularly in United States 
Government securities; and (c) absorbing temporarily out-of- line new 
issues . "* 
Only one of the banks questioned indicated that it engaged in 
any form of trading and this bank confined its trading largely to 
arbitrage . The bank in question is one of considerable size, which is 
almost a necessary requisite since each arbitrage transaction usually 
produces but a very small return. 
All bankers agreed that this is an area that the small banker 
would do well to stay clear of. Trading is only for those banks with 
the capital, the experience, and the current trading facilities required 
for this business . A good illustration of this point is provided in a 
recent survey of Federal and state supe.rvisory agencies .** It is an 
example of overtrading the bond account. This particular bank had total 
# The simultaneous sale of a security in one market and the repurchase 
of the same type of security in another market at lower cost. 
*3, P• 292 . 
-H-2, PP• 57-59. 
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resources of $2,600,000 and capital accounts of $146,000. The 
institution had been trading in "municipals" on an almost unbelievable 
scale. Successive examination reports showed progressive increases in 
both the number and size of the trading transactions as well as a 
sharp decline in their average profitability. During the last period 
studied, bond sales totaled about $2,500,000, which was four times as 
large as they were three years earlier. The annual volume of sales had 
increased to such an extent that they not only equalled ,the bank 1 s total 
assets, but they also amounted to 3t times the investment portfolio and 
almost 20 times the capital account. As a result of this excessive trading, 
there existed "· •• a depreciation of $270,000 on the date of examination, 
which rendered the bank wholly insolvent. 11->k The remaining municipal 
issues had low coupons and long maturities. Over 80 percent matured 
after 20 years. 
This case demonstrates that excessive trading can fairly 
rapidly impair the soundness of a small bank, even though the trading is 
mainly in securities that are considered to be high grade. 
Bond losses of banks 
Because of the present high corporate income taxes, tax 
considerations occupy a prominent place in investment portfolio management. 
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Often as the result of tax loss exchanges, substantial tax savings can 
be produced and, at the same time, the basic strength of the portfolio 
may be improved. 
Up to the second half of 1954, the bond market was strong and 
sales (by banks) were usually made at a profit. As a result, many banks 
ended the year 1954 with their bond costs at a very high level. When 
the bond market declined in the spring of 1955, most banks bound bond 
prices below their costs. The result was that numerous banks adjusted 
their portfolios by taking losses in issues that they had previously 
purchased at a high price, and reinvested the proceeds in other issues 
not identical to those sold. In addition to the improvement in their 
investment portfolios, these banks were often able to improve their 
yield by selling premium bonds and buying new bonds at par or below, or 
by buying a bond with a higher coupon than the one sold. This operation, 
commonly called "tax switching", has been utilized by most banks during 
the recent period of falling bond prices. 
Tax relief is offered by special treatment accorded to banks 
with respect to net bond losses. net loss for the year on sales and 
exchanges of bonds, or other indebtedness securities, may be deducted 
in full from income which otherwise would be taxed at Federal income 
tax rates. A net gain for the year, on the other hand, would be taxed 
at the capital gains tax of only 25 percent (if the securities sold 
had been held longer than six months). 
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In other words, if a bank has other taxable income in excess 
of $25,000, a net loss for the year would reduce taxes by 52 percent 
(to the extent that taxable income did not fall below $25,000). In 
addition, in Massachusetts, if present state taxes are included, a bank 
only loses 44 cents on each dollar of capital loss. A net capital gain, 
however, would be taxed at just 25 percent. Thus, since taxes are less 
on gains than on losses, it is to a bank's advantage to take losses in 
one year and gains in another. 
Questionnaire results point out that the banks are not only 
fully aware of this, but that they have been putting this lmowledge to 
good use during the period of this survey. Replies indicate that for 
most banks, 1956 and 1957 were so-called "loss years." On the other 
hand, it is very probable that 1958 will be a "gain year" for many 
banks. Also, most bankers were of the opinion that, conservatively 
speaking, capital gains and losses resulting from portfolio operations 
should be taken 11into11 and "out of" a bond reserve account. Otherwise, 
reported earnings in a 11loss year" would suffer, and earnings in a 
"gain year" would be unduly high. 
CHAPTER IX. 
ANALYSIS OF "ALLOCATION OF 
COMMERCIAL BANK FUNDS 11 TECHNIQUE 
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In banking literature, more than one analytical approach has 
been put forth in regard to the employment of commercial bank funds . 
Up to this point, this author has generally adhered to the viewpoint 
that has come to be known as the "priorities technique . " The basis of 
this approach is the establishment of a list of priorities in the use 
of bank funds, as outlined in the last section of Chapter II. One of 
the best known of the other approaches is the "allocation technique", 
sometimes referred to as a plan for the "conversion of commercial bank 
funds" . The purpose of this chapter is first to explain this "allocation" 
approach and then to analyze it . 
Description of the "allocation technique" 
Allocation theorists like to point out that one of the factors 
contributing to the failure of commercial banks during the last depression 
was the "lack of synchronization between the types of assets and types 
of liabilities . "* Banks that embrace this approach will supposedly 
synchronize their assets with the demands of their depositors . Instead 
of allo1ving the loan portfolio to increase and decrease with the demand 
for loans, its fluctuations will be coordinated with the variations in 
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the deposits and the capital funds . If this plan is followed, the 
allocation theorists claim that the liquidity and safety of customers' 
and stockholders t funds will be better rewarded with "adequate and 
consistent net profits . " 
The basic assumption governing this approach is that a commer-
cial bank is in business for three purposes: (a) To handle the deposits 
of a communit,r; (b) to meet a reasonable loan demand of this community; 
and (c) consistent with objectives (a) and (b), to be as profitable as 
it can far the stockholders . 
The "allocation technique" recognizes that commercial bank 
liabilities differ in characteristics, and that these liabilities can be 
divided into several categories according to these characteristics . 
Each categor.y of liabilities should then be balanced by a set of assets 
vmich are appropriate . 
Liabilities are classified according to their rate of turnover 
(the likelihood that they will rise or fall). There are generally three 
classifications: (a) Demand deposits; (b) savings deposits; and (c) 
capital funds . Capital funds include capital stock, surplus, undivided 
profits and voluntary reserves . Sometimes two other classifications are 
added, special demand deposits (e . g. , due to banks and public funds) 
and special time deposits (e . g., temporary public funds) . 
Since den~nd deposits are the most volatile, the assets which 
are balanced With these should be shorter in maturity (more marketable) 
I 
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than those which are allocated to savings deposits and capital funds . 
Likewise, since capital funds normally change very slowly, offsetting 
assets can be longest in maturity. 
Table IV is an example of a possible allocation of the funds 
of a commercial bank along the lines described above . For study purposes, 
it falls into three divisions: (a) The major sources of funds available 
for allocation; these appear across the top of the table; (b) the assets 
vmich are listed down the left-hand side of the table; and (c) the 
percent ages used in allocating the liabilities into the appropriate 
assets . 
In relation to a bank's investments, allocation writers state 
that cash should be kept at a safe minimum level. concerning loans, invest-
ments are considered as supplements to a bank 1s loan portfolio. Thus, 
if loans are rather long or somewhat lacking in quality, investments 
should be of relatively short maturity and of high quality. 
Theorists state that this approach can be applied to different 
banks only after each bank has established its own yardsticks . This is 
accomplished by analyzing the past behavior of demand deposits, savings 
deposits, cash and investments . 
Analysis 
In order for this plan to be workable, a bank must have control 
over the way in which it uses its funds . In practice, this is usually 
not the case . Most banks have to employ their funds as they can. For 
TABLE IV. 
An Example of the Allocation of a Commercial 
Bank's Funds 
Assets: 
Primary Reserve: 
Cash, due from banks, etc . 
Secondary Reserve: 
U .. S. Governments, short 
term, call loans, cornm. 
paper 
Total Liquid Assets 
Loan Portfolio: 
Secured by marketable 
coil. 
First mortgages 
Consumer Credit 
Prime unsecured 
Total 
Investment Portfolio 
u.s. Governments, long 
term 
High grade municipal and 
industrial obligations 
Total 
Legal Reserve 
Federal Res . Acct. 
Grand Total 
Demand Deposits 
8% 
23% 
31% 
12% 
8% 
10% 
10% 
40% 
12% 
5% 
17% 
12% 
100% 
Time Deposits 
4% 
6% 
40% 
10% 
4% 
bO% 
11% 
4% 
E% 
~ 
100% 
Source: Allocation of Commercial Bank Funds . Harold E. Zarker, 
Boston, Bankers Publishing Co . , 1957 . 
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Capital Funds 
25% 
25% 
35% 
15% 
575% 
100% 
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example, loan demand is not something that each bank can regulate like 
the flow of water from a faucet . It can be estimated for a period but 
there is no guarantee that the estimate and the percentage of a bank ' s 
funds that are supposed to be in loans will be the same (or even very 
close) . 
As far as this writer can see, there is no provision for 
seasonal fluctuations in this plan. The "allocation technique" appears 
to be intended for banks where there is very little fluctuation of 
deposits . This factor, alone, severely limits the adaptability of this 
approach. Also, it casts considerable doubt upon one of the objectives 
of the plan, that of 11 • •• providing for liquidity and 'flexibility' 
of funds . • • " 
Advocates of this plan acknowledge that adoption of this 
approach would result in considerably less income from the "earning 
assets" of a bank than is usually the case . Their answer to this is 
that a bank should make up for the smaller income by selling its services 
at an adequate (meaning higher) price . This, proponents point out, 
would offset the lower return on the invested assets. But, this feature 
also points to the lack of feasibility of this approach. If one bank 
in a community should unilaterally attempt to raise its service charges 
enough to make up the difference in its earnings, its business would 
undoubtedly fall off considerably. Even if all banks in a community 
adopted this plan and raised their service charges together, a sizeable 
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amount of business would probably be lost to banks in nearby 
communities. The only solution here would be for all banks throughout 
the country to raise their service charges equally and at the same 
time. This, of course, is not even a remote possibility in a free 
enterprise system such as ours . 
On the favorable side of the ledger, since liquidit,y consider-
ations take such a large position of importance over profitability goals, 
widespread adoption of this plan would avoid a large part of the heavy 
losses and charge-offs experienced by rnaey banks in the past. As one 
writer phrases this thought, "gains result primarily from the avoidance 
of losses . n-11-
Findings 
The evidence above clearly indicates that the adoption of this 
approach is not advisable except in a communit,y where the following 
factors predominate:** 
*5, P• 27. 
·**-5, P• 9. 
(a) The bank does not have large demand deposits 
which fluctuate violently. 
(b) The bank's community is largely made up of 
conservative and frugal individuals. 
(c) The local industry is well diversified; and 
(d) Wage and employment conditions are satisfactory. 
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Even if there are many communities in which these factors 
are present, hurdles such as control over a bank's loan demand, and 
the inevitable rise in service charges would have to be overcome. For 
these reasons, it is extremely doubtful if this plan will ever be 
considered "workable" on a wide scale. 
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CHAPTER X. 
SUl~Y AND CONCLUSIONS 
The intent behind writing this paper was to observe and 
comment upon current developments in commercial bank investment port-
folio management. With the bond portfolio accounting for some 35 per 
cent of a typical bank ' s total assets and for about 25 per cent of 
the bank's income, the importance of this area is evident . 
An investigation into the ability of commercial banks to 
assume investment risks did not disclose anything that bankers have not 
been aware of since the depression of the 130 1s . Liquidit.y require-
ments of banks are still first and foremost . The investment require-
ments of their institutions have not changed so that bankers can safely 
reach for yieldsat the long end of the bond market . Nor is there any 
prospect that these requirements will change in the foreseeable future . 
If banks were to reach for yields, they.would be unwisely sacrificing 
proper maturity spacing. 
As far as the obligations of an investment portfolio are 
concerned, questionnaire results indicated that there was general agree-
ment in this area . The priorities agreed upon were: (a) Safety of 
funds (quality); (b) availability of funds (liquidity); and (c) earnings 
(profitability) . Here one is able to obtain some idea of the relationship 
of liquidity and profitability in the management of bank funds . 
74 
Inquir,y into the manner in which bank investment policy is 
formulated brought out some interesting facts. The first is that it 
is unusual for a commercial bank to have its investment policy in 
written form. From this can be inferred that in some banks there is 
bound to be a lack of coordinated investment effort. It should be 
added that most banks undoubtedly do have a well-conceived investment 
policy even though such a policy is not in writing. It is also true 
that the mere preparation and adoption of a written policy does not 
guarantee satisfactory investment results. Yet, it is contended that 
those banks which do have a written policy are likely to have more 
efficient investment operations than those that are without it. The 
fact that an institution has expended the necessar,y thought and effort 
to have a policy in written form is a strong indication that the bank 
is handling its investment problems to the best of its ability. 
Another noteworthy fact is that some bank portfolio managers 
are becoming more interested in better reporting concerning the basic 
situation of their own bank (e.g., deposit and loan characteristics of 
the bank). Investment managers appear to believe that more effort in 
this direction can pay off in proportionately better portfolio performance. 
The fact that the larger banks are an excellent source of 
easily accessible investment advice, coupled with the information that 
this avenue is ver,y often not utilized to the extent it should be, 
suggests that many small bankers are not obtaining the performance that 
I 
1: 
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they might from their investment portfolios . Survey results appear 
to substantiate this since it was seldom that any of the smaller 
bankers stated that they frequently consulted with their larger corres-
pondents concerning their investment policies . 
Concerning corrmercial bank liquidi~, available information 
indicates that policy in this area becomes very important during periods 
of rising loan demand such as banks have just passed through . It takes 
an experienced banker to not only know when his loan-deposit ratio is 
high enough, but also to take positive action (e . g. , turning away new 
loan applications) to ensure that adequate liquidi~ is maintained. 
In the area of secondary reserves, survey results point out 
that only bonds maturing within two years should be considered as 
falling within this reserve categor,y. This information is a direct 
result of events occurring during the last period of rising interest 
rates . This is not to imply, however, that this segment of portfolio 
management is being badly handled. To the contrary, questionnaire 
replies shaw that most banks are following excellent procedures in the 
establishment of their reserves . Regarding the tertiary reserve, 
results indicate that it is advisable to follow a spaced maturity 
policy out to a period no longer than ten years . Exceptionsto this 
advice are rare . The ladder effect is especially good for the small 
bank that is limited concerning the quality of its investment management. 
Information received regarding the types and characteristics 
of securities suitable for commercial bank investment indicates that 
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bankers have been neglecting "agency bonds" as a source of investment. 
These bonds are right behind United States Treasury obligations as far 
as minimum risk is concerned, and their liquidity appears to be better 
than many bankers believe . Reports point out that their marketability 
is often better than many municipals . This type of security is 
especially good for the small bank that intends to hold most of their 
obligations to maturity. 
Economic forecasting is rapidly becoming very important in 
inves tment portfolio management. From the replies one may conclude that 
the large banks have a decided edge in this direction, and that the small 
banker should give more attention to this subject. Although yield 
curves are no longer considered to be as important as they once were, 
this area probably merits more effort than it is currently receiving . 
Survey results plainly show that investment diversification 
is not Widely practiced in bank portfolio management . This occurs in 
spite of the fact that this concept applies only to the "municipals" 
and "corporates" held by cormnercial banks . In the opinion of this writer, 
geographical diversification should at least be practiced regarding a 
bank's municipal holdings . It is this area that appears to be most 
seriously neglected in the institutions surveyed. 
As far as trading is concerned, available information implies 
that, for the most part, it is not being improperly engaged in. Question-
naire results show only one of the larger banks practicing this type of 
"scalping" operation. In addition, all bankers agreed that this procedure 
is not recommended for the small bank or for the inexperienced. 
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In this period of high corporate income taxes, every bank 
portfolio manager should be well versed in the tax position of his own 
bank. Survey results not only indicate this to be the case, but also 
point out that this information was actively employed (e . g. , in "tax-
switching") during the period of this survey. 
Generally speaking, there are two recognized approaches in 
banking texts regarding the management of commercial bank funds . The 
most widely accepted is called the "priori ties technique." The less 
·widel y known and adopted method is the "allocation technique . " As the 
result of the survey and a critical analysis, it was found that the 
"allocation technique" is definitely lacking in many respects . There-
fore, it is doubtful if this approach will ever be widely accepted in 
its present form. 
On the basis of this survey and the information presented 
above, there follows a series of recommendations which banks of all 
sizes are urged to follow: 
(1) Investment policy should be reduced to written form. 
(2) More thinking needs to be directed towards basic 
fundamentals (e . g. , better reporting concerning the 
characteristics of each bank) . 
(3) Small banks should more fully utilize the investment 
guidance of their larger correspondents . 
(4) Only bonds maturing within two years should be 
included within the secondary reserve . 
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(5) Follow a spaced maturity policy out to a 
maximum of ten years in the tertiary reserve. 
(6) Look into the advantages of holding "agency bonds." 
(7) Build up experience in the area of forecasting. 
(8) Do not neglect the safety behind investment 
diversification as far as "municipals" and "corporates" 
are concerned. 
From an overall viewpoint, this survey discloses that bank 
investment portfolios are generally well managed. Few dangerous practices 
were uncovered and a high-caliber type of individual was usually found 
in charge of the various portfolios. The most encouraging discovery, 
however, was that many portfolio managers are continually striving for 
better performance through new and revised procedures. These investment 
officers and the banks concerned feel that there is always room for 
improvement in portfolio poli~. In closing, the author hopes that this 
philosophy will someday become the rule instead of the exception. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Part I: Specific Portfolio Practice 
A. Formulation of Bank Investment Policy: 
1 . How are investment decisions made at your bank? 
a . By an individual? 
b. By a committee? 
c . Other? 
2. To what extent does your bank seek investment advice from 
correspondents? 
a . Seldom? 
b. Often? 
3. To what extent do correspondents seek your advice concerning 
their investment portfolio? 
a . Seldom? 
b. Often? 
4. Does your bank consult sources other than regularly published 
information and correspondents? If so, please list. 
5. Is your investment poliqy in written form? 
a . Yes? 
b . No? 
6. How is your policy implemented? 
1. vVhat "rules of thumb11 or general standards are used in making 
these decisions (e . g. , ·~e never buy anything other than 
"governments" ")? 
8. In what manner has your "policy formulation procedure" changed 
over this period? 
B. Goal of Bank Investment Programs: 
1. How would your bank rate the following obligations of an 
investment portfolio? 
a . Earnings (profitability)? 
b . Safety of funds (quality)? 
c . Availability of funds (liquidity)? 
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c. Portfolio Size: 
1 . Are there any subdivisions (or classes) within your portfolio 
(e . g . , primary reserves, secondary reserves)? 
a. Yes? (What?) 
b . No? 
2. Are there any subdivisions within the secondary reserve account? 
3. If so, are separate policies applied to each subdivision? 
a . Yes? (What?) 
b . No? 
4. What securities are suitable for secondary reserve use? 
5. How has the size of your portfolio varied over this period? 
a . Smaller? 
b . No change? 
c . Larger? 
D. Portfolio Quality: 
1. Percentage breakdown: 12/54 12/55 12/56 12/57 
a . u.s. Treasuries 
b . Municipals 
c . Corporates 
2. Quality: M.micipals 
12/54 12/55 12/56 12/57 
Corporates 
12/54 12/55 12/56 12/57 
a. AAA 
b. AA 
c . 
d . BAA 
E. Maturity Policy: 
1 . Does your bank follow any one policy in regard to maturity spacing? 
a. Yes? (What?) 
b . No? 
2 . What was the average maturity of your portfolio at the following 
dates? 
12/54 12/55 12/56 12/57 
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F. Forecasting: 
1 . To what extent does your bank attempt to forecast future 
interest rate movements? 
2. To what extent does your bank act on the basis of these forecasts? 
3. When the tight-money situation became evident, what action did 
your bank take in the area of its investments? 
4. To what extent did your bank foresee the recent November downturn 
in interest rates? 
5. Does your bank use yield curves in its forecasting? 
a . Yes? 
b . No? 
6. How does your bank interpret the recent prevailing "flat yield 
curve"? 
G. Diversification (of non-governmental securities): 
1 . Does your bank have a definite policy in regard to this area? 
a . Yes? (What?) 
b . No? 
2 . To what extent has your policy changed during this period? 
H. Trading: 
1 . To what extent does your bank engage in "trading"? 
I . Earnings: 
1 . Does your bank regard your investment portfolio as more of an 
earning asset than previously? 
a . Yes? 
b . No? 
2. What was the average yield of your investment portfolio at the 
following dates? 12/54 12/55 12/56 12/57 
3. Does your bank attempt to obtain a predetermined yield (or a 
yield within a specified range)? 
a . Yes? (What?) 
b . No? 
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Part II: General Portfolio Policy 
A. Formulation of Bank Investment Policy: 
1. In what manner did your investment policies and decisions change 
as rising interest rates became evident throughout the country 
and in your area? 
2. Do you now feel that you took about the "most appropriate" 
action at the time? Looking back at these decisions what 
alternative moves might have been made? 
3. During this period (12/54 - 12/57), what were the feelings of your 
bank concerning the intensity and duration of ntight-money11 ? 
(Looking back, did your bank expect the rates to go as high as 
they did for as long as they did?) 
B. Goal of Bank Investment Programs: 
1 . In general terms, how would you describe the goal of your bank 
investment program? 
2 . How does your investment portfolio income fit into your overall 
profit objectives? 
3. How vrould you state the relationship of your investment portfolio 
to your loan portfolio? To what extent are your loan and 
investment policies interrelated? 
c. Portfolio Size: 
1 . If the size of your portfolio varied over this period, what 
caused these changes? 
D. Portfolio Qualit,r: 
1 . \Vhat position should each of the follovr.ing securities have in a 
typical bank investment portfolio? 
a . Direct obligations of the u.s. Treasury: 
1 u.s. Treasury Bills 
2 " " Certificates of Indebtedness 
3 " n Notes 
4 " 11 Bonds 
b . u.s. Government Agency Bonds: 
c . MUnicipal & other tax free obligations: 
1 General Obligation Bonds 
2 Housing Authority Bonds 
J Revenue Bonds 
d. Corporates: 
1 Utility 
2 Railroads 
~ Industrials 
E. Maturity Policy: 
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1. How would you describe the overall maturity policy of your bank? 
F. Forecasting: 
1. What types of forecasts does your bank attempt to make? 
2. How does your bank go about forecasting interest rate changes? 
G. Diversification (of non-governmental securities): 
1. Describe your general policy in this area: 
H. Miscellaneous Questions: 
1. From the follovdng establish an order of priority for the 
employment of commercial bank funds: 
a. Customer credit demands : 
b . Open-market investment for income: 
c . Primary reserves: 
d. Protective investment: 
2e What pressures has your Bank Investment Officer been subject to 
during this period (e.g . , liquidit.f, correspondents, etc . )? 
3. What issues did your bank consider to be the most critical during 
this period? 
4. How large is your "time savings department"? Is there any 
relationship between the amount of time deposits and the average 
maturity of your investment portfolio? 
5. Do you subscribe to any particular school of thought concerning 
the use of bank funds (e . g. , the "conversion theoryrt?) 
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6. Does your bank attempt to keep fully invested at all times? 
At any time by design? 
7. Does your bank feel that there should be any relationship 
between maturity policy and your loan-deposit ratio (The 
idea being that a low loan-deposit ratio permits a longer 
average maturity and vice versa)? 
8. ~Vhat is your attitude towards capital gains and losses in 
your investment account? 
9. In what way have examiner attitudes affected your investment 
policies? 
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